ECE 443/518 – Computer Cyber Security Lecture 25 Malware

Professor Jia Wang Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Illinois Institute of Technology

November 18, 2024

[Malware](#page-3-0)

[Stack Overflow](#page-14-0)

[Blue Pill](#page-23-0)

- ▶ This lecture: ICS 19
- ▶ Next lecture: Hardware Security

[Malware](#page-3-0)

[Stack Overflow](#page-14-0)

[Blue Pill](#page-23-0)

▶ A piece of software running in a computer system that may impact normal operation or cause damage.

▶ Virus, worm, adware, ransomware, etc.

- \triangleright From the viewpoint of secure policy, the system is actually in an insecure state.
	- ▶ Computer systems are so complicated nowadays that human being cannot really decide if a system state is secure or not.
- ▶ To make matters worse, malware may exploit errors and bugs in OS, applications, and services to bypass access control.

Life Cycle

- 1. Dormant phase
	- ▶ Infect the host system.
	- ▶ Survive reboot, removal, or even reinstallation.
- 2. Propagation phase
	- \blacktriangleright Infect other systems via a shared media.
- 3. Triggering phase
	- ▶ Being activated by various system or network events.
	- ▶ Lay low to avoid detection.
- 4. Execution phase
	- ▶ Perform predefined malicious behavior.
- ▶ Defense mechanisms can be designed to address various portion of the life cycle.
- ▶ Attackers adapt to computing trend when creating malware.
	- \blacktriangleright Skip and combine phases.

▶ Infection: bypass existing access control mechanism.

- ▶ Exploit human ignorance or error via social engineering.
- \blacktriangleright Inject code via bugs.
- ▶ Survival: persistence of (binary) program
	- ▶ Files: hidden files, fake system files, end of other files, etc.
	- ▶ File systems: unused partition area, NTFS data streams, etc.
	- ▶ Firmware: disk controller, network controller, etc.

▶ Defense

- ▶ Educate non-technical people.
- **IMPROVE SYSTEM USABILITY TO reduce human error.**
- Improve software quality to reduce bugs.
- ▶ Scan storage area for suspicious data.
- \triangleright Correspond to infection during dormant phase.
- ▶ Propagation consumes system and network resources and may be detected by monitoring so.
	- \triangleright The most hostile malware will attempt to propagate silently as much as possible without being caught.
	- ▶ In practice, many malwares won't care since they target at common people.
- ▶ Defense: isolation and containment
	- ▶ So infected or suspicious systems won't cause harm to others.
	- \blacktriangleright Via firewall, virtual machine, etc.

Triggering Phase

- ▶ Persistence of the malware program ties to how it is triggered.
- ▶ Malware programs may also be triggered via remote control.
	- ▶ E.g. coordinated for a DDoS attack.
- ▶ The malware would need to consume resource to detect triggering events while laying low to avoid detection.
	- ▶ Short burst: awake for a very short time everytime something happens, e.g. as a browser plugin that runs everytime a page loads.
	- ▶ Long live: monitor system status continuously, e.g. as a fake system process or reside in a valid system process.
- ▶ Defense: more places to scan for suspicious data.
	- ▶ A scan could trigger the malware to stop the scan itself.
	- Isolation and containment help if the malware is triggered remotely.

▶ Damages

- ▶ Physical damage to components and attached devices, e.g. CIH, Stuxnet.
- ▶ Exhaust resources, e.g. Morris worm.
- ▶ Data erasure, e.g. ransomware.
- ▶ Leakage of sensitive data or access right.

\blacktriangleright Defense

- ▶ Fail-safe mechanisms for components and attached devices.
- \blacktriangleright Backup data.
- ▶ Isolation and containment.

Layered Defense

- ▶ Multiple defense mechanisms are required to be integrated in a layered fashion for a complex computer system.
	- ▶ Users with different knowledge of technology and sense of security.
	- ▶ Systems running programs with different trust levels.
- \blacktriangleright Isolation and containment within a system.
	- ▶ So an infected subsystem will have less chance impact others.
	- ▶ Fine grained access control: programs are only granted permissions to a minimal number of subsystems.
- \blacktriangleright Communication only via predefined interfaces.
	- \blacktriangleright Explicit flow of information.
	- ▶ Allow more focused efforts to locate bugs.
- ▶ Trojan Horses: a program with an overt (documented or known) effect and a covert (undocumented or unexpected) effect.
- \blacktriangleright Life cycle
	- ▶ Trojan houses usually involve a lot of techniques for survival and triggering.
	- ▶ Trojan horses open doors for other programs to propagate and execute.

Typical Malware: Computer Viruses

- ▶ Virus: the malware cannot exist by itself and must attach to existing programs.
- \blacktriangleright Infection: computer virus modifies other executable files
	- \blacktriangleright Append itself to the end.
	- \blacktriangleright Call it when the program starts.
- \blacktriangleright Infection simplifies dormant and triggering phases.
	- ▶ But this makes scanning of suspicious data easier via use of patterns and hashes.
- ▶ Propagation is usually achieved by infecting executables on removable medias.
	- ▶ Most OS are aware of such risk and usually will notify users so.

Typical Malware: Computer Worms

▶ Worms propagate.

- ▶ Via network.
- ▶ How worms propagate?
	- ▶ Buggy network service programs, in particular old unpatched services with known vulnerabilities.
	- ▶ Buggy browsers and careless email users.
- ▶ Worms by themselves usually do no harm during execution other than exhausting resources.
	- But attackers usually combine trojan horses with worms to create malwares strong at dormant, propagation, and triggering – opening doors to execute any malicious code.

[Malware](#page-3-0)

[Stack Overflow](#page-14-0)

[Blue Pill](#page-23-0)

- \blacktriangleright A typical software bug.
- ▶ A service program runs at a higher trust level that allows clients to access resources.
	- \blacktriangleright Locally or remotely, both via predefined communication channels and protocols for access control.
- ▶ Attacks as clients exploit bugs in the service program to inject codes that run within it at the higher trust level.
	- **Effectively bypass access control mechanisms.**
- ▶ Portion of the memory is managed as a stack to facilitate function calls.
	- ▶ Stack: last in, first out.
- \blacktriangleright The stack entries are organized logically as stack frames.
	- ▶ Each stack frame contains information regarding a particular function call.
	- ▶ Arguments, return address, local variables.
	- \triangleright Details depend on the calling convention.

Stack Frame Example

}

}

```
void test(int a) {
    int v[10];
    printf("%d\nu", v[a]);
void caller() {
    test(20);
    printf("Done.\n");
  ▶ Assume all arguments are passed via the stack.
  ▶ When caller calls test
        ▶ Push 20 for the argument a.
        ▶ Push return address of test, i.e. address of
           printf("Done.\n");.
        ▶ Jump to first instruction of test.
  ▶ Inside test
        \blacktriangleright Push 10 int for the local variable v.
        \blacktriangleright Visit stack to obtain a.
        \blacktriangleright Visit and print v[a].
        ▶ Pop 10 int to destroy the local variable v.
        \triangleright Pop the return address and jump to it.
18/27 ECE 443/518 – Computer Cyber Security, Dept. of ECE, IIT
```
The Vulnerability

```
void test(int a) {
    int v[10]:
    printf("%d\n", v[a]);
}
void caller() {
    test(20);
    printf("Done.\n");
}
```


▶ The C language doesn't check for that for performance reasons.

▶ Depend on where stack grows.

▶ If stack grows down, e.g. on x86 processors.

- \blacktriangleright v[a] for $a < 0$ refers to a lower memory location, which contains garbage not belonging to the stack.
- \triangleright v[a] for $a > 10$ refers to a higher memory location that may be used by a stack entry.

```
void test(int a, int b) {
    int v[10];
    v[a] = b;}
void caller() {
    int a, b;
    scanf("%d %d", &a, &b);
    test(a, b);
    printf("Done.\n");
}
```
- ▶ Attacks inject code by overwriting stack entries if the implementation does not check input values.
- ▶ Those modified stack entries will be interpreted by other portion of the program to trigger the actual code execution.
- ▶ Modify portion of the stack to include a shellcode, e.g. a small program.
- ▶ Modify the return address to point to the shellcode.
- ▶ When the function returns, the shellcode runs within the original program.
	- ▶ It could simply attack from there, or open doors for further attacks, e.g. by creating an account if the original program runs as root.
- ▶ Defense: executable space protection
	- ▶ Mark the memory portion used by stack as non-executable.
	- ▶ Supported by processor, enforced By OS

 \triangleright Modify the return address to point to an existing function.

- \blacktriangleright E.g. one from libc where almost all programs make use of.
- \triangleright Need to modify additional entries on the stack so that the libc function is called with meaningful arguments.
	- ▶ E.g. modify the return address and additional stack entries to call system("/bin/sh") so that the attacker can access the shell program.
- ▶ Defense: address space layout randomization (ASLR)
	- ▶ Load functions to different addresses everytime so attackers won't know their addresses.
	- ▶ Enforced when OS loads a program to execute.
- ▶ Heap overflow attacks: modify stack indirectly by exploiting buggy accesses to memory blocks allocated dynamically.
- ▶ Integer overflow attacks: access portion of memory through a pointer not for such purpose.
- \triangleright Many of such problems also cause software to fail in general we may borrow from software practices to reduce their chances to happen.
	- ▶ Use a safer language that checks indices for array visits and that managers dynamic allocations automatically – actually almost all languages designed in the past 30 years are doing so. \blacktriangleright Test a lot.

[Malware](#page-3-0)

[Stack Overflow](#page-14-0)

[Blue Pill](#page-23-0)

Hypervisor and Virtual Machine

- \triangleright For security purpose, we generally depend on virtual machines to provide necessary isolation and containment.
	- ▶ Modern OS does provide certain level of isolation between kernel and applications.
	- ▶ But they are mostly for accidental errors but not security risks.
- ▶ Virtual machines are supported by both hardware and a special piece of software called hypervisor.
	- ▶ Similar to OS, hypervisors make it possible to virtualize/share hardware resources.
	- ▶ Hypervisors are not as complicated as OS so that there will be less chance to have buggy services.
- \triangleright Since hypervisor controls the hardware, it knows anything running on the processor.
	- ▶ What if hypervisors are compromised?
	- ▶ What if processors/hardware are compromised?
- ▶ A conceptual hypervisor-based malware.
- \blacktriangleright The malware itself is the hypervisor.
	- ▶ Small in size, but may perform any operation on the OS running on top of it.
- ▶ Could the OS running under full control of a hypervisor know it is running under a hypervisor?
- ▶ Malware works within access control but may bypass it via errors and bugs.
- \triangleright More powerful malwares may be created by combining malwares strong for different life cycle phases, requiring defense mechanisms to be more effective.
- \blacktriangleright However, it is human beings that control the computer system so one should not underestimate the human risk factor even a very strong defense mechanism is used.