ECE 443/518 – Computer Cyber Security Lecture 17 Cryptocurrency and Smart Contract

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Outline

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- ▶ This lecture: Cryptocurrency, Smart Contract
- ▶ Next lecture: Bitcoin Management, Oblivious Transfer

Outline

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- \triangleright Consensus on what the next block should be is a must for cryptocurrency.
	- ▶ Otherwise adversaries can create branches for double spending.
- ▶ Many BFT protocols are too weak to be useful here.
	- ▶ E.g. both the ones without or with digital signatures need to know how many traitors are there, but for cryptocurrrency adversary can create arbitrary number of "traitor" accounts.
- \blacktriangleright The BFT propocol need to weight the participants differently.
	- ▶ So adversaries cannot simply overwhelm the protocol by creating more accounts, a.k.a. Sybil attack.

Proof of Work (PoW)

- ▶ Who willing to generate the next block needs to perform certain amount of work before it could join the BFT protocol.
	- ▶ Typical work: for a block of hash s, find x so that $h(s||x)$ is smaller than a threshold.
	- If h is preimage resistant, one can only find such x via brute-force.
	- ▶ Block time: the expected time for some account to find a solution x.
	- ▶ When more computational power are available, the threshold is reduced such that the block time remains unchanged.
- ▶ Who willing to participate will have an account to receive economic incentives for the work.
- \triangleright Proof of Work consensus: the branch with the most of work is the correct one
	- ▶ The consensus can be reached as long as honest account owners can provide majority of work.

Obtaining the Blockchain

- ▶ Consider an account that want to generate the next block.
	- \triangleright By using a program together with its private key.
- ▶ The program connects to Internet to query the blockchain.
	- ▶ However, there could be adversaries so the program must decide if the chain it receives is valid or not.
- \blacktriangleright The genesis block: the first block of the blockchain.
	- ▶ The genesis block is assumed to be well-known, usually coded into the program directly.
	- ▶ The genesis block could contain data like cryptocurrency parameters and initial balances for certain accounts.
- \blacktriangleright The program need to validate past transactions.
	- ▶ It is necessary to accumulate balances for all accounts to decide if transactions are valid – this is possible now since our computers are actually quite powerful.
- ▶ However, recall that valid transactions along cannot prevent branches (and thus double spending).

PoW Fork Choice

- \triangleright Fork: the program may receive multiple blockchains all with the same correct genesis block.
	- \blacktriangleright They diverge somewhere back in the history.
	- ▶ Resulting from a temporary network partitioning or an attack.
- \triangleright Choice: with PoW, the program should pick the blockchain with the most of the work as the correct one.
	- ▶ The work is measured as the total effort to solve the problems for all the blocks along the chain.
- \triangleright 51% attack: attackers controlling more than half of the computational power could collude to cause a successful fork.
	- ▶ Suppose currently the honest accounts are at the chain $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow C$ from an earlier block A.
	- ▶ The attackers make a fork $A \rightarrow B'$ and continue.
	- ▶ No matter how many blocks are there between A and C, the attackers can eventually reach D' as $A \rightarrow B' \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow D'$, that contains more work than the chain created by the honest accounts now as $A \to B \to \cdots \to C \to \cdots \to D$

PoW Finality

- \triangleright With 51% attack, powerful attackers can revert transactions by creating successful forks.
	- \blacktriangleright It may take some time but 100% the attack will be successful.
- ▶ Can attackers with less computational power revert a block?
	- ▶ Finality: we need to define when a block is considered "final" and thus is not supposed to be changed or reverted.
	- ▶ Fake check scams are classical examples of attacks on finality for our banking system.

▶ Consider an attacker controlling 25% of computational power

- ▶ Suppose the current chain is $A \rightarrow B$ and honest accounts are working on the block C.
- \blacktriangleright If B is considered final immediately, the attacker will attempt to make a fork $A \to B' \to C'$ when A was ready.
- If C' can be generated ahead of C in time, honest accounts may simply follow the chain $A \rightarrow B' \rightarrow C'$.
- \triangleright With 25% of computational power, this may happen with a probability of $(\frac{25\%}{75\%})^2 = \frac{1}{9}$.
- ▶ Practically, one should wait a few blocks to reduce the chance of having forks due to possible attacks.

Economic Incentives

- ▶ How could PoW cryptocurrencies actually survive when finality is always probablistic, and when powerful adversaries could have the majority of computational power?
- ▶ Economic incentives to attract honest accounts to participate in the BFT protocol.
	- \triangleright Transaction fees: the account creates the next block will take all the transaction fees.
		- \triangleright When there is more transactions than what the next block can hold, payers compete by paying more transaction fees.
	- ▶ Mining: the account creates the next block is allowed to award itself a predefined amount of money.
		- \blacktriangleright As a transaction with no payer.
- \triangleright As a consequence, powerful adversaries have economic incentives to not cheat.
	- \blacktriangleright It is more rewarding to participate honestly than to make the cryptocurrency useless by attacking it.
- ▶ PoW consensus achieves a great success and enables a lot of honest account owners to participate.
- ▶ For a fixed block time, need to increase complexity of work.
	- ▶ So more energy is needed to generate one block.
	- **hardware depreciation** $+$ energy cost $+$ profit $=$ mining income
- ▶ Proof of stake: accounts stake a certain amount of the cryptocurrency itself to participate in the consensus process.
	- ▶ Without the need of computing complex works (and thus consume less energy) to resist Sybil attacks.
	- \blacktriangleright Honest accounts are rewarded with transaction fees.
	- ▶ Attackers may have their staked cryptocurrency burned.

Outline

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From Ledger to State Machine

- ▶ The ledger as stored in the block chain can be treated as a very simple state machine.
	- \blacktriangleright Initial state: initial account balances
	- ▶ Currect state: current account balances
	- ▶ State transitions: each blockchain transaction updates account balances by addition and subtraction.
- \blacktriangleright The blockchain can support more complex state machines.
	- \triangleright Allow accounts to define state variables in addition to balance.
	- ▶ Allow blockchain transactions to perform more operations on state variables than simple addition and subtraction.
- ▶ This is similar to how we build computer hardware and software to support general purpose computing need.
	- ▶ E.g. Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) defined by the Ethereum blockchain uses 8-bit opcode and a stack to organize its 256-bit registers, and supports high-level programming languages like Solidity.

Smart Contract

- ▶ What are the benefits of running state machines and thus programs in a blockchain?
	- ▶ Not for efficiency: each computation needs to be executed as many times as anyone would need to validate the blockchain, using the same inputs and generating the same output.
	- ▶ Nonrepudiation: the account initiates a computation must sign the request and cannot deny so.
	- \blacktriangleright Integrity: the outcome is permanentely recorded in the blockchain and cannot be reverted.
	- \triangleright As long as there is no branch.
- ▶ That is what is necessary to execute a contract.
	- ▶ Smart contract: a program running inside a blockchain.

A Smart Contract Example

```
pragma solidity 0.8.7;
contract VendingMachine {
 // Declare state variables of the contract
 address public owner;
 mapping (address => uint) public cupcakeBalances;
 // When 'VendingMachine' contract is deployed:
 // 1. set the deploying address as the owner of the contract
 // 2. set the deployed smart contract's cupcake balance to 100
 constructor() {
   owner = msg.sender;
    cupcakeBalances[address(this)] = 100;
 }
  ...
```


- \blacktriangleright No you don't receive an actual cupcake.
	- ▶ What you received could be treated as a ticket or token to redeem a physical cupcake somewhere.

```
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```
Smart Contract Account

```
...
constructor() {
  owner = msg.sender;
  cupcakeBalances[address(this)] = 100;
}
...
```
- ▶ Once created, a smart contract will has its own address, as indicated by address(this)
- ▶ Other accounts interact with the smart contract by sending (signed) messages to the smart contract account.
- ▶ The smart contract will handle these messages in member functions.
	- ▶ constructor is a special one called for the first message which deploys the smart contract.

The Message Sender

```
contract VendingMachine {
 // Declare state variables of the contract
 address public owner;
 mapping (address => uint) public cupcakeBalances;
 // When 'VendingMachine' contract is deployed:
 // 1. set the deploying address as the owner of the contract
 // 2. set the deployed smart contract's cupcake balance to 100
 constructor() {
   owner = msg.sender;
    cupcakeBalances[address(this)] = 100;
 }
  ...
```
 \blacktriangleright msg. sender indicates who initiates the computation.

▶ The payer of cryptocurrency.

```
\blacktriangleright The sender should in addition specify what transactions
   (member function) is to be performed (called).
```
▶ E.g. one of constructor, refill, and purchase

▶ Plus other necessary parameters.

Transactions

```
contract VendingMachine {
  ...
 // Allow the owner to increase the smart contract's cupcake balance
 function refill(uint amount) public {
   require(msg.sender == owner, "Only the owner can refill.");
    cupcakeBalances[address(this)] += amount;
 }
 // Allow anyone to purchase cupcakes
 function purchase(uint amount) public payable {
   require(msg.value >= amount * 1 ether, "1 ETH per cupcake");
   require(cupcakeBalances[address(this)] >= amount, "Not enough in stock");
    cupcakeBalances[address(this)] -= amount;
    cupcakeBalances[msg.sender] += amount;
 }
}
```
 \triangleright msg. value indicates money the sender pays the the contract.

▶ The money is transfered from the sender address to the contract address automatically if the computation completes successfully.

▶ How could one withdraw money from the contract?

Complications

▶ What if there is an infinite loop into a smart contract?

- \triangleright Can be exploited by adversaries to jam the blockchain.
- \blacktriangleright In theory, we cannot detect if there is an infinite loop in a program.
- \triangleright On blockchain, we can solve the issue by limiting the number of instructions a smart contract may execute by the transaction fee the sender would like to pay.
- ▶ Since the program of a smart contract need to be deployed to the blockchain, everyone can see and analyze it.
	- ▶ Bugs in the program could be found and exploited by adversaries.
- ▶ Both proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS) work as the consensus mechanism for cryptocurrencies.
- ▶ Smart contracts are programs running inside a blockchain, reacting to blockchain events.